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Abstract—An experimental testbed has been created for devel-
oping and evaluating Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
signal authentication techniques. The testbed advances the state
of the art in GNSS signal authentication by subjecting candidate
techniques to the strongest publicly-acknowledged GNSS spoofing
attacks. The testbed consists of a real-time phase-coherent GNSS
signal simulator that acts as spoofer, a real-time software-
defined GNSS receiver that plays the role of defender, and
post-processing versions of both the spoofer and defender. Two
recently-proposed authentication techniques are analytically and
experimentally evaluated: (1) a defense based on anomalous
received power in a GNSS band, and (2) a cryptographic
defense against estimation-and-replay-type spoofing attacks. The
evaluation reveals weaknesses in both techniques; nonetheless,
both significantly complicate a successful GNSS spoofing attack.
Keywords: Cryptographic signal authentication, GNSS se-
curity, GNSS spoofing detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication of civil Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) signals is increasingly a concern. Spoofing attacks, in
which counterfeit GNSS signals are generated for the purpose
of manipulating a target receiver’s reported position or time,
have been demonstrated with low-cost commercial equipment
against a wide variety of civil Global Positioning System
(GPS) receivers [1]–[3]. Such attacks threaten the security
of financial transactions, communications, power distribution,
and transportation, which all depend on GNSS signals for
accurate positioning and timing [4]–[8].
Whereas the military GPS waveform is by design unpre-
dictable and therefore resistant to spoofing [9], civil GPS
waveforms—and those of other civil GNSS—are unencrypted,
unauthenticated, and openly specified in publicly-available
documents [10], [11]. Also, although not entirely constrained
by the signal specifications, the navigation data messages
modulating these civil waveforms are highly predictable. The
combination of known signal structure and data bit predictabil-
ity makes civil GNSS signals an easy target for spoofing
attacks.
A number of promising methods are currently being devel-
oped to defend against civil GNSS spoofing attacks. These can
be categorized as (1) receiver-autonomous signal-processing-
based techniques, which require no antenna motion or special-
ized hardware apart from the GNSS receiver itself [12]–[18];
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(2) receiver-autonomous antenna-based techniques, which re-
quire antenna motion or specialized antenna hardware [19]–
[25]; (3) receiver-autonomous techniques based on fusing
GNSS observables with measurements from non-GNSS sen-
sors such as inertial sensors [26]; (4) cryptographic techniques
that require signal specification modifications to overlay un-
predictable but verifiable modulation on existing or future civil
GNSS signals [27]–[29]; and (5) techniques that exploit the
existing encrypted military signals to offer civil GPS signal
authentication for networked GPS receivers [30]–[33]. The
best protection against GNSS spoofing will likely involve a
combination of these.
Existing and proposed GNSS signal authentication schemes
are all premised on hypothesis tests involving statistical mod-
els for the authentic and counterfeit GNSS signals. In general,
the statistics of the null hypothesis (only authentic signals
present) are well known and readily verified by laboratory
experiment, but the statistics of the alternative hypothesis
(spoofing attack underway) are poorly characterized, for two
reasons. First, the exact parameters of a spoofing attack (e.g.,
spoofing signal power, number of spoofing signal transmitters,
initial spoofing signal code and carrier phase alignment with
authentic signals, etc.) are typically unknown to a defender; at
best a defender can assume only an approximate probability
distribution for such parameters. Second, in constructing a
model to describe the alternative hypothesis, one often makes
simplifying assumptions to facilitate analytical treatment of
the detection problem. Thus, even if the spoofing parameters
were perfectly known, the modeled distribution and the true
distribution may differ in important ways.
The uncertainty involved in characterizing the alternative
hypothesis points to the need for model validation via ex-
periment. Unfortunately, GNSS signal generation hardware
capable of the most sophisticated spoofing attacks is neither
commercially available nor straightforward to construct. Thus,
for example, experimental validation of the authentication
technique proposed in [30] was limited to the null hypothesis,
and validation of the technique proposed in [15] was limited to
an unsophisticated repeater-spoofer attack scenario, which, as
will be shown herein, led to an overly optimistic performance
assessment. A testbed capable of simulating sophisticated
and realistic spoofing attacks is needed so that the efficacy
of proposed GNSS signal authentication techniques can be
experimentally evaluated.
This paper makes two primary contributions. First, it de-
scribes an experimental testbed that has been created for
developing and evaluating GNSS signal authentication tech-
niques. The testbed consists of a software-defined real-time
2phase-coherent GNSS signal simulator capable of carrying
out sophisticated spoofing attacks, a real-time software-defined
GNSS receiver that plays the role of defender, and post-
processing versions of both the spoofer and defender. Previous
work has exercised the testbed or its spoofer component [2],
[3], [29], [32], [34]–[36], but this paper is the first to describe
the testbed as such and to offer a comprehensive view of
its capabilities. The paper’s second primary contribution is
an analytical and experimental evaluation of two recently-
proposed civil GNSS signal authentication techniques, the
received power spoofing detector proposed in [15] and the
security code estimation and replay (SCER) attack defense
proposed in [29]. In the course of evaluating the SCER attack
defense, the paper details how the defense can be implemented
in practice within a GNSS receiver. This will be useful for
receiver manufacturers in the event that proposed techniques
for modulating cryptographic signatures on broadcast civil
GNSS signals get implemented [28], [37].
The following section describes the testbed. Thereafter,
the two signal authentication schemes are introduced and
evaluated.
II. TESTBED DESCRIPTION
The real-time version of the signal authentication testbed
consists of an advanced version of the GPS L1 C/A spoofer
originally presented in [1] and a real-time software-defined
GNSS receiver that plays the role of defender. A post-
processing version of the testbed has also been developed to
allow more flexibility in iterated testing of various spoofer and
defender strategies. Schematics of both versions are shown in
Fig. 1.
In the real-time testbed, the spoofer ingests authentic GPS
L1 radio-frequency (RF) signals and outputs a counterfeit
GPS L1 C/A RF signal ensemble. The counterfeit ensemble is
combined with the original authentic signal ensemble in an RF
combiner, and the composite authentic-counterfeit ensemble
is directed to a software-defined GPS receiver. The spoofer
can operate using its internal temperature-compensated crystal
oscillator, but is most often driven by a higher-quality external
oscillator to ensure minimal apparent variation in the time
solution implied by the counterfeit signal ensemble.
In the post-processing testbed all signal processing down-
stream of the RF front-end operates on digital samples instead
of analog RF signals. The end-to-end processing sequence is
as follows: (1) the incoming authentic GPS L1 signals are
digitized and stored, (2) the spoofer ingests the stored digital
signals and outputs signals in a digital form, (3) the spoofer’s
output signals are combined with the digitized authentic signal
stream via sample-wise digital multiplexing, (4) the receiver
operates directly on the multiplexed digital data.
A. Spoofer
The University of Texas GPS spoofing device, shown in Fig.
2, is an advanced version of the original spoofer introduced
in [1]. To the authors’ knowledge, it is the most sophisticated
publicly-acknowledged spoofing device. The latest version is
capable of simultaneously tracking and spoofing up to 14
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Fig. 1. Schematics depicting the real-time and post-processing versions of the
signal authentication testbed. Thin lines in both schematics represent coaxial
cables conveying analog signals, whereas thick lines in the lower schematic
represent digital data streams.
GPS L1 C/A signals while continuously attempting to acquire
emerging GPS satellite signals. Other key features of the
spoofer relevant to the testbed are phase alignment, navigation
data bit prediction, variable output attenuation, noise padding,
arbitrary generation of parity-correct navigation data streams,
and SCER attack capability.
Fig. 2. The University of Texas real-time GPS spoofing device. The device
as shown here is configured for over-the-air transmission but is only used as
such in authorized tests [2], [3], [38]. More commonly, the spoofer’s output
signals are conveyed to the target receiver by coaxial cable or digital data. The
computer shown atop the spoofing device runs a client application that allows
a user to monitor and control a spoofing attack over a wireless or wireline
network. The client-spoofer network connection is insensitive to latencies of
hundreds of milliseconds, which permits a spoofing attack to be controlled
remotely over the Internet.
1) Phase Alignment: The spoofer receives authentic civil
GPS L1 C/A and GPS L2C signals and generates counterfeit
GPS L1 C/A signals that are code-phase aligned with their
authentic counterpart signals to within a few nanoseconds.
In the real-time testbed, code-phase alignment is achieved
by signal feedback. During a post-turn-on calibration phase,
the spoofer acquires and achieves phase and data lock on all
available authentic GPS L1 C/A signals. It then generates a
simulated RF GPS signal whose spreading code is different
from those modulating each of the authentic signals. It feeds
3this unique signal back from its RF output to its RF input via
an internal RF switch. At this point, the spoofer is able to
acquire and track its own feedback signal in addition to the
available authentic signals. By measuring the average offset
between the feedback signal’s received and transmitted code
phase over an interval of time, the spoofer is able to precisely
determine its own digital and analog latency. The latency,
which amounts to approximately 5 ms, varies from turn-on
to turn-on but remains constant to within the measurement
precision thereafter, as can be verified by repeated calibration.
In the post-processing testbed, there is no need to com-
pensate for processing latency, but the output of the digital
input/output (I/O) spoofer must nonetheless be nanosecond-
aligned with the digitized authentic signal stream. This is
effected by sample-level adjustment in the digital combiner
and sub-sample-level adjustment in the digital I/O spoofer.
As the spoofer attempts to induce a position or timing
deviation in the target receiver by shifting the code phase of
its counterfeit signals, it can adopt either of two strategies with
respect to carrier phase generation. In the default mode, the
rate of change of its signals’ carrier phase is proportional to the
rate of change of the corresponding code phase. Let τ˙ and θ˙
represent the rate of change of code phase and carrier phase,
in seconds per second and radians per second, respectively.
Then in the spoofer’s default mode these are related by
θ˙ = 2pifcτ˙ (1)
where fc is the GPS L1 frequency in Hz.
In an alternative mode, the so-called frequency lock mode,
the spoofer maintains approximately fixed whatever initial
carrier phase offset arises between its counterfeit signals and
the authentic signals even as it shifts the code phase of its
counterfeit signals to induce a position or timing deviation in
the target receiver. This ability to approximately lock the rela-
tive (counterfeit-to-authentic) carrier phase even while shifting
the relative (counterfeit-to-authentic) code phase enables the
spoofer to evade some spoofing detection strategies that are
designed to watch for the rapid amplitude variations caused
by interacting authentic and counterfeit phasors of comparable
magnitude when the authentic and counterfeit θ˙ values differ.
However, when operating in the frequency-lock mode, the
spoofer is limited to a code phase pulloff rate that lies within
the target receiver’s code tracking loop bandwidth, which
can be as low as 0.05 Hz for carrier-aided code tracking
[39]; otherwise, the target receiver will lose code lock on the
counterfeit signals and the attack will be unsuccessful.
The spoofer makes no attempt to align its signals’ carrier
phases to those of the authentic signals. Nonetheless, by
virtue of its carrier phase tracking and phase-locked signal
generation, the real-time spoofer achieves nearly perfect phase
coherence with the authentic signals during initial alignment
(before tracking loop pulloff is attempted). More precisely, the
differential Doppler frequency between each counterfeit signal
and its authentic counterpart, as seen by the target receiver, is
less than 0.01 Hz, a small offset that arises due to a linear
approximation of the carrier phase trajectory over the ∼ 5-
ms latency interval. In the post-processing testbed, differential
Doppler is insignificant.
Precise carrier phase alignment would allow for more potent
spoofing attacks, as it would enable generation of anti-phase
signals that, if properly amplitude-matched, could annihilate
each authentic signal. The spoofer could then generate a
secondary ensemble of spoofing signals, in addition to the
first anti-phase signal ensemble, which would be free of the
telltale phase and amplitude variations caused by interac-
tion with the authentic signals. However, such carrier phase
alignment may only be practically possible under controlled
laboratory conditions, as it would require spoofer-to-target
relative position knowledge to within a small fraction of the
carrier wavelength, which is approximately 19 cm for GPS
L1. Indeed, the practical difficulty of carrier phase alignment
in the field is the premise of the spoofing defense in [36].
2) Navigation Data Bit Prediction: To initialize an attack
with an induced position, velocity, and timing solution that is
indistinguishable from the authentic solution, it is not enough
for the spoofer to achieve code-phase alignment with the
authentic signals, it must also align its simulated navigation
data bits with those of the authentic signals. However, due to
processing, geometrical, and cable delays, it is impossible for
the real-time spoofer to read the value of the navigation data
bits off the air and replay them accurately and without delay.
Indeed, this impossibility is precisely what makes navigation
message authentication effective for GPS signal authentication,
as discussed in [28] and [29].
Rather than read the navigation data bits off the air for
immediate replay, the real-time spoofer takes advantage of the
near perfect predictability of the navigation data that modulate
the GPS L1 C/A signals. Over the course of a 12.5-minute
superframe, the spoofer collects the data bits corresponding
to each tracked GPS satellite. Alternatively, the spoofer can
obtain the 12.5-minute superframe for each satellite from its
control computer, which has access to a network of software-
defined receivers of the type described in [40] and [41] that
continuously generate intact superframes. Thereafter, the real-
time spoofer compensates for its ∼5-ms processing delay, and
for geometrical and cable delays, by predicting the value of
the navigation data stream slightly more than 5 ms in advance.
In this way, the spoofer can achieve meter-level alignment
between its signals and the authentic ones at the location of a
target receiver.
3) Variable Output Attenuation: Before exiting the real-
time spoofer, counterfeit signals pass through an attenuator
with a 31.5-dB range whose attenuation value can be set dy-
namically by the spoofer’s control computer. This enables the
spoofer to finely adjust the so-called spoofer power advantage,
or the ratio of the power of the counterfeit signal ensemble
to the power of the authentic signal ensemble as seen by the
target receiver.
In the post-processing testbed, spoofer power advantage is
adjusted by the digital combiner, which multiplexes blocks of
ns spoofing and na authentic samples, where ns and na are
user-defined integers. By properly adjusting the ratio ns/na, a
user can approximately achieve any reasonable spoofer power
advantage.
4) Noise Padding: The signal ensemble generated by the
testbed’s spoofer contains only a modest amount of noise.
4In other words, the native noise floor of the output signal
ensemble is low—much lower than the noise floor present at
the output of a high-quality GPS receiver’s low-noise amplifier
(LNA). To appreciate the consequence of this low native noise
floor, consider that if the spoofer is configured to generate
only a single output GPS L1 C/A signal, corresponding to a
single pseudo-random number (PRN) code, the native C/N0
of the output signal exceeds 60 dB-Hz. Of course, when more
simulated GPS signals are added to the ensemble, the C/N0
associated with any one of the signals drops due to multiple-
access interference.
A low native noise floor would not be a problem for the
spoofer if it were always configured to match the power of
each counterfeit signal to that of the corresponding authentic
signal at the RF input to the target receiver. In this case,
the noise floor observed by the target receiver is essentially
determined by the LNA in the receiver’s own front-end.
But in some cases it may be advantageous for the spoofer
to significantly overpower the authentic signals; for example,
to eliminate interaction with them. In these cases, if the
spoofer is generating a small number of simulated signals,
the C/N0 values registered by the target receiver for each
received GPS signal become unnaturally high, owing to the
low native noise floor of the spoofer’s output ensemble. When
generating a large number of signals—approximately 13 or
more—the signals’ mutual interference is sufficient to establish
an appropriate noise floor for any particular spoofed signal.
To prevent unnaturally high C/N0 values, the spoofer can
be configured to add a variable level of “noise padding”—
broadband interference—to its own output ensemble. In this
way, the spoofer can dictate a maximum C/N0 value for each
of its output signals even while transmitting at high power.
5) Arbitrary Navigation Message Generation: In its default
mode, the spoofer attempts to exactly match the data it
modulates onto its counterfeit signals with the true navigation
data on the corresponding authentic signals. This data-bit
matching fails only in three circumstances: (1) during the
first 18 seconds after a 2-hour GPS time boundary, when the
GPS satellites begin broadcasting new ephemeris parameters
in frames 1-3; (2) during a 12.5-minute superframe in which
one or more satellites begin broadcasting new almanac data
in frames 4-5, which occurs roughly once per day for each
satellite; and (3) when the GPS satellites change reserved
bits, which they occasionally do for reasons related to military
receiver security. Other than in these situations, the spoofer’s
data bit matching is exact.
In some situations it may be advantageous for the spoofer
to modulate its counterfeit signals with arbitrary data instead
of matching the true navigation data streams bit-for-bit. This
may be desirable, for example, to support a data manipulation
attack, as in [42]. The testbed’s spoofing device is capable
of generating such arbitrary modulating data. For stealth and
convenience, it does impose some structure on the data: (1)
it maintains the legacy GPS subframe, frame, and superframe
data format, (2) it populates the Handover Word (HOW) and
the Telemetry Word (TLM) to match the authentic signals,
(3) it respects data bits that are fixed in the GPS interface
specification, and (4) it ensures that the data streams satisfy
standard GPS L1 C/A parity checking.
6) SCER Attack Capability: The spoofer is capable of
executing a so-called security code estimation and replay
(SCER) attack. This attack targets cryptographic spoofing
defenses in which an unpredictable (to the spoofer) security
code modulates the transmitted GPS signal, whether as a
component of the navigation data stream (navigation message
authentication) or as higher-rate modulation.
When configured for a SCER attack, the spoofer seeks
to estimate as best it can each security code chip value of
each GPS signal that it intends to spoof. Its estimate for
any particular chip is no better than a random guess at the
beginning of the chip but improves rapidly thereafter. For a
signal with received carrier-to-noise of C/N0 = 54 dB-Hz,
which is the highest that can be expected from a standard
single-element hemispherical-gain-pattern GNSS antenna [43],
the spoofer’s chip estimation error becomes negligible after
only 8 µs of averaging [29]; for more modest C/N0, a few
tens of µs is sufficient. As the spoofer obtains an estimate
of each successive security code chip, it immediately injects
this estimate into its signal replica generator, which is primed
with up-to-date spreading code and carrier replicas. Thus the
spoofer can approximately replicate even security-enhanced
GNSS signals.
B. Defender
Opposite the spoofer in the real-time and post-processing
testbeds sits a software-defined GNSS receiver that plays the
role of defender. All digital signal processing downstream of
the defender’s RF front end is implemented in software on a
(possibly multi-core) general-purpose processor. A software-
defined receiver is well-suited for the role of defender because
it is flexible enough to support rapid implementation and
testing of a wide range of proposed defense strategies.
The particular software-defined receiver incorporated in the
testbed, called GRID, is the result of nearly a decade of
collaboration between the University of Texas at Austin and
Cornell University [40], [41], [44], [45]. It has been designed
for single- or multi-core platforms and has been implemented
on Intel x86, Texas Instruments, and ARM processors. For
efficient processing, key features of the receiver are its bit-wise
parallel correlation strategy [46]–[48], its parallel architecture
for multi-core implementation [45], and its use of SIMD
instructions. Individually, and in combination, these features
enable efficient signal processing despite the receiver being
implemented on a general-purpose processor. On a 6-core
processor, for example, GRID is capable of tracking 1150
parallel 5.7 Msps-sampled (real) GPS L1 C/A signals in real
time.
Other key features of GRID useful for evaluating candidate
signal authentication strategies are
1) access to raw 12-to-16 bit quantized digital samples prior
to automatic gain control, which makes it possible to
accurately measure changes in received in-band power;
2) a multi-tap correlation architecture, which allows exami-
nation of the correlation profile at arbitrary tap locations
and with arbitrary density; and
53) sample-wise access to the product of the incoming signal
and the local signal replica, which allows formulation
of the detection statistic required in the SCER attack
defense.
Details of these features will be introduced as needed in
subsequent sections.
III. EVALUATION OF THE RECEIVED POWER DEFENSE
For an important class of spoofing attacks, an admixture
of authentic and spoofed GNSS RF signals is incident on
the defender’s antenna, which increases the total received
power PT in a GNSS band of interest beyond levels typically
measured in the absence of spoofing. This observation suggests
a low-complexity signal authentication strategy in which the
defender chooses the null hypothesis H0 (no spoofing attack
underway) when PT is within a nominal range, and the
alternative hypothesis H1 (spoofing attack underway) when
PT falls outside the nominal range. Indeed, this defense is
proposed in [15] as “an extremely powerful means to detect
spoofing, making spoofing no more of a threat than the much
less sophisticated radio interference/jamming.” This section
evaluates the received power defense to determine whether
it is indeed as potent as advertised.
A. Underlying Assumptions
Signal authentication based on PT depends crucially on two
assumptions, discussed below.
1) The Admixture Assumption: The received power defense
assumes that a full admixture of counterfeit and authentic
GNSS signals is present in the received band. If instead the at-
tacker is able to partially or completely eliminate the authentic
signals received by the defender, whether by annihilating these
with anti-phase spoofing signals or, more simply, by covering
the target antenna with an RF shield, then the attacker can
prevent the defender’s PT from changing significantly during
an attack.
The admixture assumption is reasonable in cases where (1)
physical security prevents the attacker from gaining physical
access to the defender’s antenna, and (2) the attacker does not
know the location of the defender’s antenna to centimeter-level
accuracy and so cannot mount an authentic-signal-annihilation
attack. It is worth noting that some GNSS applications of
practical interest violate these conditions: physical security
obviously cannot be ensured when the attacker is in possession
of the target receiver, as with a GPS ankle monitor or a vessel
monitoring system [6], and the usual practice of mounting a
GNSS antenna with open-sky access may enable an attacker to
estimate its precise location, especially in the case of a static
antenna.
Ref. [15] argues that, with proper calibration, “it should
be possible to detect if the receiver is operating in open sky
conditions or is blocked.” But this is not the case, as one
can appreciate with a simple thought experiment. Recall that
the testbed’s spoofer can adjust its output power over a 31.5
dB range in increments of 0.5 dB, and can artificially adjust
the noise floor of its output signal ensemble. Moreover, the
spoofer can independently measure the contribution to PT
due to ambient RF signals and background temperature and
can accurately measure the relative C/N0 of available GNSS
signals. It follows that the spoofer can match both the absolute
power of the authentic signal ensemble and the absolute C/N0
value of each received GNSS signal. Thus, an attacker with
physical access to a target receiver’s antenna could slip a metal
enclosure with an interior transmit antenna over the target
antenna without causing significant variation in the defender’s
measured PT and C/N0 values. Incidentally, this “tin bucket”
attack is also problematic for the pincer defense introduced in
[36] and for defenses based solely on C/N0 monitoring, as in
[14].
2) The Small Unpredictable Variations Assumption: The
received power defense also assumes that unpredictable vari-
ations in PT , owing, for example, to solar radiation or to
man-made but non-spoofing RF signal interference, are either
small compared to the variations caused by spoofing, or rare.
Otherwise, the false alarm rate for the spoofing detection test
will be unacceptably high. This assumption is tested in [15]
by monitoring variations in the automatic gain control (AGC)
voltage, a proxy for 1/PT , over several days in quiescent (non-
spoofing) conditions, and by comparing these with variations
in AGC voltage observed during a live spoofing attack. In
all cases tested, the AGC values during the spoofing attack
stand out clearly against the quiescent AGC values when-
ever the target receiver’s navigation solution is significantly
affected. However, the attack executed in [15] does not permit
determination of the minimum increase in PT for a successful
spoofing attack because the target receiver is always moving
toward or away from the spoofer, so the spoofer cannot attempt
a slow-pulloff low-transmit power attack. Moreover, [15] does
not attempt to characterize common but unpredictable varia-
tions in PT introduced by non-spoofing phenomena.
B. Detection Test
Signal authentication based on received signal power
amounts to a binary hypothesis test in which the measurement
PT can be modeled as
H0 : PT = PA + PI + PN , (2a)
H1 : PT = PC + PI + PN (2b)
where PA =
∑
i PA,i is the received signal power from an
ensemble of n authentic GNSS signals in the absence of
spoofing, PA,i being the power of the ith authentic signal;
PI is the received power from all man-made non-spoofing RF
interference sources; PN = N0B is the received power from
spectrally-flat receiver noise with densityN0 passing through a
one-sided RF front-end bandwidth B; and PC is the combined
received power of the authentic and spoofing signals. The
density N0 is primarily determined by the noise figure of the
receiver’s first-stage LNA but also includes broadband noise
due to solar and black-body radiation.
1) Effect of Coherence: Because of possible coherence
between the received counterfeit and authentic signals, the
combined signal power PC is not simply a sum of the authentic
and counterfeit signal powers. Let the total spoofing signal
power that would be received in the absence of authentic
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∑
i PS,i, with PS,i being the spoofing signal
power corresponding to the ith authentic signal. Further, let
each PS,i be decomposed as PS,i = PSc,i+PSn,i, where PSc,i
is the component of spoofing power that is coherent with the
ith authentic signal and PSn,i is the non-coherent component.
The coherent component is assumed to have phase offset ϕi
with respect to the ith authentic signal. One can now write
PC as
PC =
n∑
i=1
[√
PA,i + cos(ϕi)
√
PSc,i
]2
(3)
+ sin2(ϕi)PSc,i + PSn,i
This expression indicates that, for each i, the noncoherent
component PSn,i adds directly to PC , as does sin
2(ϕi)PSc,i,
which is the power in the coherent component that lies in phase
quadrature to the authentic signal. By contrast, cos2(ϕi)PSc,i,
which is the spoofing power component that is phase aligned
with the authentic signal, does not add directly to PC but
instead interacts with the authentic signal as shown. For k ∈ Z,
the ith spoofing signal contributes maximally to PC when
ϕi = k2pi (phase alignment), minimally when ϕi = (1+2k)pi
(anti-phase alignment), and power-additively—as if a purely
noncoherent signal—when ϕi = (1/2 + k)pi (orthogonal
alignment).
It is interesting to note that if the phase offsets ϕi are
treated as independent random variables uniformly distributed
on [0, 2pi], then the expected value of PC is equivalent to
the PC that arises in the case of purely noncoherent spoofing
signals; i.e.,
E[PC ] = PA + PS
Moreover, because the variance of PC goes inversely with the
number of signals n, it follows that for large n and ϕi ∼
U [0, 2pi], PC can be approximated as
PC = PA + PS (4)
However, the independence condition on the ϕi can be violated
in practice by a spoofer with wavelength-level knowledge
of the defender’s antenna position, because in this case the
spoofer can generate an ensemble of counterfeit signals at least
some of whose ϕi will be similar. This has been demonstrated
in the laboratory with this paper’s testbed, as shown in Fig. 3.
Outside the laboratory, however, violating (4) is only slightly
less challenging for the spoofer than nulling the authentic
signals.
2) Spoofing Power Advantage: For convenience, define
η , PS/PA (5)
as the spoofing power advantage. Then PC becomes a function
of η, with PC(η = 0) = PA, and PT can be rewritten as
PT = PC(η) + PI + PN (6)
which, under the assumptions behind (4), becomes
PT = (1 + η)PA + PI + PN (7)
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Fig. 3. Received power in a 2-MHz band centered at the GPS L1 frequency
showing the onset of a spoofing attack using this paper’s testbed, normalized
by the average value of PT prior to the attack. The attack begins with a sudden
increase in PT just before 100 seconds. Thereafter, the authentic power PA
and spoofing power PS were maintained constant; thus, the oscillations in
PT can only be due to strong coherence between the spoofing and authentic
signals with similar values of ϕi.
The hypotheses can now be written
H0 : η = 0, (8a)
H1 : η ≥ ηm (8b)
where ηm ≥ 0 is the minimum power advantage applied by a
spoofer in an attack.
3) Simplifying the Composite Test: In view of (3), (6), and
(8), deciding between H0 and H1 amounts to a composite
hypothesis test in which the parameters η and ϕi, i = 1, . . . , n
are simple under H0 but can take on a range of values under
H1. The test can be reduced to a simple (non-composite)
hypothesis test in two steps. First, since this paper’s interest
is in evaluating the strongest embodiment of the received
power defense, let it be assumed that the defender knows
the exact value of η. Second, assume the attacker does not
have wavelength-level knowledge of the defender’s antenna
position, in which case it is reasonable to model the offsets
ϕi as independent random variables uniformly distributed on
[0, 2pi]. Stacking these as ϕ = [ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕn]
T and denot-
ing the distribution of PT under Hj by pPT |Hj ,ϕ(ξ|Hj , θ),
j = 0, 1, one can integrate out ϕ-dependence by
pPT |Hj (ξ|Hj) =
1
(2pi)n
∫
pPT |Hj ,ϕ(ξ|Hj ,φ) dφ j = 1, 2
where the multi-dimensional integral is taken over the range
of ϕ. The likelihood ratio can now be formed as
Λ ,
pPT |H1(ξ|H1)
pPT |H0(ξ|H0)
The optimal detection test compares Λ against a threshold
[49]:
Λ
H1
≷
H0
γ˜ (9)
This notation is interpreted as “choose H1 if Λ exceeds γ˜;
otherwise choose H0.” If the distribution of Λ is denoted
pΛ|Hj (λ|Hj), j = 0, 1, then, for a chosen false alarm
probability PF , one sets γ˜ to satisfy
PF =
∫ ∞
γ˜
pΛ|H0(λ|H0) dλ (10)
7The resulting detection probability is
PD =
∫ ∞
γ˜
pΛ|H1(λ|H1) dλ (11)
In many cases the test in (9) can be reduced to a simpler,
equivalent test, e.g., by taking the log of both sides. Whatever
quantity is ultimately compared against the final threshold,
denoted γ, is called the detection statistic. For the special case
where PC , PI , and PN are modeled as Gaussian distributed,
the problem becomes a simple location test in which the
detection statistic reduces to PT , which is itself Gaussian
distributed [50]. Moreover, for small variations in PT , the
transformation to dB units via PT (dBW) = 10 log10(PT )
is approximately linear. Hence, for PC , PI , and PN Gaussian,
PT (dBW) can also be modeled as Gaussian.
C. Minimum Spoofing Power Advantage
Performance of signal authentication based on PT depends
crucially on η, PA, PI , and PN , with the detection test
becoming more powerful as η increases or as the variance
in PA, PI , and PN decreases. This section seeks to define
ηm, a lower bound on η; the following section will examine
PA, PI , and PN .
1) Signal Model: By way of relating the parameters in
(3), (5), and (6) to a signal model, consider an attack in
which the received spoofing power is entirely coherent so that
PS =
∑
i PSc,i. Note that this implies the spoofer’s output
consists only of clean signal replicas with no quantization
noise or noise padding. The defender’s received signal at
sampling instant t can then be represented by a complex
baseband model as
r(t) =
∑
i
{Di(t)Ci [t− τai(t)] exp [jθai(t)] (12)
+
√
ηDi(t)Ci[t− τsi(t)] exp [jθsi(t)]}+ I(t) + n(t)
where, for the ith authentic signal, which is tracked in the
receiver’s ith channel, Di(t) is the navigation data, Ci(t)
is the spreading code, τai(t) is the authentic signal’s code
phase, θai(t) is the authentic signal’s carrier phase, τsi(t) is
the spoofing signal’s code phase, θsi(t) is spoofing signal’s
carrier phase, I(t) is a zero-mean complex process that models
non-spoofing interference associated with PI , and n(t) is a
zero-mean complex white Gaussian noise process that models
the noise associated with N0. This model remains a useful
approximation even when mild quantization effects are present
in the spoofing signals; it will be assumed to hold in the
following analysis.
2) Successful Capture: A spoofer seeking to capture the
defender’s code and carrier tracking loops on each tracking
channel while minimizing the likelihood of detection will
operate with η near unity. Suppose that η = 1 and that, for
the ith signal, τsi(t) = τai(t) and θsi(t) = θai(t) + ϕi(t).
In this case, the received counterfeit and authentic GNSS
signals are matched in amplitude and structure, differing only
in carrier phase offset. If the spoofer now attempts pulloff of
the defender’s code phase tracking points in the default mode
where code and carrier phase rates are related by (1), and if the
spoofer maintains its carrier phase pulloff rate ϕ˙i well below
the defender’s carrier phase tracking loop bandwidth BL, then
symmetry dictates that the spoofer’s probability of successfully
capturing the ith channel’s code and carrier tracking loops is
pci = 0.5.
In the absence of interference and noise [I(t) = n(t) = 0],
η > 1 would be sufficient to guarantee capture of every
channel’s loops provided |ϕ˙i/2pi| ≪ BL, i = 1, . . . , n. But
in the presence of interference and noise, η > 1 cannot
guarantee capture even in the limit as ϕ˙i → 0. This is
because during pulloff there will be intervals during which
ϕi(t) ≈ (1+2k)pi, k ∈ Z, so that the counterfeit and authentic
phasors will nearly annihilate each other. This phenomenon,
which is redolent of severe ionospheric scintillation [51], can
result in frequency unlock of the defender’s carrier tracking
loop, which for this paper’s purposes is considered a failed
capture.
For the ith signal, and for η > 1, the carrier-to-noise
ratio during anti-phase alignment of counterfeit and authentic
signals is
PA,i(η − 1)
N0
To prevent frequency unlock, η must be chosen such that
PA,i(η − 1)/N0 > β, where β is the threshold value of
C/N0 required for frequency-unlock-free carrier tracking. This
implies that, for all i, η must satisfy
η > 10 log10
[
10(β−PA,i/N0)/10 + 1
]
dB
in which η, β, and PA,i/N0 are expressed in dB. For a standard
second- or third-order Costas-type GNSS carrier tracking loop
with an update interval of 20 ms and BL = 5 Hz, phase unlock
begins below approximately C/N0 = 24 dB-Hz [39], so one
may take β ≈ 24 dB-Hz as a conservative approximation for
the frequency unlock threshold (the frequency unlock thresh-
old is always below the phase unlock threshold). Thus, for a
weak GNSS signal with PA,i/N0 > 35 dB-Hz, η ≥ ηu = 1.08
(0.33 dB) would be required to prevent unlock.
3) Numerical Simulation and Testbed Experimentation: If
η ≥ ηu, then averaging within the tracking loops will ensure
pci → 1 as ϕ˙i → 0. But a pulloff rate of zero is hardly
useful for the spoofer. Within the more interesting interval
0 < |ϕ˙i/2pi| ≪ BL, the relationship between pci, η, and
ϕ˙i cannot be determined by a simple limiting case analysis.
Moreover,a more comprehensive analytical examination of
the code and carrier tracking loops is complicated by their
stochastic, discrete, and nonlinear nature and by the counterfeit
and authentic signal interaction. On the other hand, the closed-
loop tracking behavior can be readily analyzed via Monte-
Carlo simulation. Such a simulation has been carried out and
has confirmed the general trends one might have expected: (1)
for a fixed |ϕ˙i/2pi| ≪ BL, pci quickly approaches unity as η
increases beyond ηu, and (2) increasing η allows the spoofer
to increase |ϕ˙i/2pi| ≪ BL while maintaining a fixed pci.
Apart from numerical simulation, the minimum value of η
required for reliable capture has been determined experimen-
tally via the testbed. On 34 independent trial attacks, each with
8n ≥ 8 authentic signals, it was found that pci = 1 whenever
η > 1.1 (0.41 dB), provided |ϕ˙i/2pi| ≪ BL [52].
For purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that the
spoofer always operates with η ≥ ηm = 1 and that η = ηm
is enough to reliably capture the defender’s tracking loops.
This assumption is conservative as regards reliable capture
because, as discussed above, capture only becomes reliable
for η & 1.1; yet it is optimistic as regards preventing adverse
effects because a spoofer can cause a target receiver to output
hazardously misleading data even when η is slightly less than
unity. Nonetheless, for this paper it will be assumed that the
attacker is not interested in uncontrolled adverse effects but in
reliable capture requiring η ≥ ηm = 1.
4) An Illustrative Scenario: It is instructive to roughly
approximate the amount by which PT changes between H0
and H1 given η = 1. Recall that PT actually becomes the
optimal detection statistic only when PA, PI , and PN are
modeled as Gaussian random variables, but in any case PT
closely approximates the optimal statistic. It follows that the
detection test is powerful only if the increase in PT from H0
to H1 is large compared to its random deviations under H0
and H1.
A typical outside-the-laboratory spoofing attack in which
the assumptions behind (7) hold will yield the ratio
PT,1
PT,0
=
PA(1 + η) + PI + PN
PA + PI + PN
(13)
of PT under the two hypotheses. Consider an optimistic
(for the defender) scenario in which N0 = −204 dBW/Hz
(a moderately low noise floor), PI = 0 (no non-spoofing
interference), B = 2 MHz (a narrow receiver bandwidth),
and PA = −146 dBW (consistent with an ensemble of
typical-strength authentic GPS L1 C/A signals received in
a B = 2 MHz band [9]). Despite the advantages to the
defender in this scenario, PT,1/PT,0 is only 0.93 dB when
η = 1. For N0 = −201 dBW/Hz, which is more realistic for
a commercial-grade GNSS receiver, PT,1/PT,0 falls to 0.56
dB. Roughly speaking, then, powerful received-power-based
signal authentication requires that random fluctuations in PT
be substantially smaller than 1 dB. This is a restatement of
the small unpredictable variations assumption.
D. Characterization of PA, PI , and PN
The causes of variations are different for each of PA, PI ,
and PN . Some variations can be accurately predicted by the
defender, and so can be treated as deterministic, whereas
others are not practically predictable and must be modeled as
random. An analytical treatment of these random variations is
not possible, as they are highly device-, site-, and time-specific.
Therefore, this section appeals to empirical study.
Fig. 4 shows the RF spectrum centered at the GPS L1
frequency as seen by a high-quality static antenna and wide-
bandwidth RF front end combination. The power spectral
density is estimated by generating periodograms using Welch’s
method on 100-ms intervals of raw complex samples and then
averaging over 100 of these. The characteristic peak resulting
from the noncoherent combination of approximately 12 GPS
L1 C/A signals is visible above the noise floor. Two bands are
shown centered at L1, a 2-MHz band, which contains 90% of
the L1 C/A signal power, and a 10-MHz band, which contains
98%. No spurious signals are visible in either band, which
implies that PI ≈ 0.
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Fig. 4. Power spectrum centered at the GPS L1 frequency as estimated
from data captured via a high-quality static antenna and RF front end
combination in a moderately quiet outdoor RF environment on the rooftop
of the WRW building on the UT Austin campus. Bands for 2- and 10-MHz
power measurements are shown. The power density scale has been centered
just above the GPS L1 C/A peak for ease of viewing. In absolute units, the
noise floor sits at approximately -204 dBW/Hz.
Summing the 100-ms periodograms over the bands indi-
cated results in a time series of power measurements. Fig.
5 shows a two-day interval of PT in the 2-MHz band, which
reveals marked diurnal variations, the result of diurnal patterns
in temperature, solar radiation, and the overhead satellite
constellation. Even though the record’s diurnal repeatability
is evidently only good to roughly 0.3 dB, its predictability
given knowledge of local temperature and satellite orbital
ephemerides is better than this. Fig. 6 offers an expanded
view of a 5-minute interval, showing both the 2- and 10-MHz
traces. The different size of the variations in the two traces at
time scales less than about 150 seconds indicates that these
originate in PA, not PN . They are likely due to multipath
effects at the carrier phase level caused by reflections off
nearby surfaces and by atmospheric diffraction and refraction.
Close examination of multi-day records such as those in Fig.
5 reveals that these variations do not repeat appreciably at the
solar or sidereal day. Data from two other static sites were
examined, with similar behavior noted. Thus, it appears that
the practically unpredictable variations in PT about L1 have
root-mean-squared deviations of at least 0.1 dB for a 2-MHz
band and 0.05 dB for a 10-MHz band.
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Fig. 5. A two-day record of received power in the 2-MHz band shown in
Fig. 4, normalized by the average value of PT over the interval.
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Fig. 6. A five-minute record of received power in the 2- and 10-MHz bands
shown in Fig. 4, normalized by the initial values of PT in each band.
removed, is taken as the detection statistic and modeled as
H0 : PT (dBW) ∼ N (0, 0.1), (14a)
H1 : PT (dBW) ∼ N (0.56, 0.1), (14b)
where the mean value under H1, 0.56, is taken from the
discussion of PT,1/PT,0 in Section III-C4. Choice of an
acceptable PF depends on the cost of a false alarm, which
may range from a site visit to the grounding of an aircraft. As
a reasonable value, assume only one false alarm per year is
acceptable. Then if, due to the time correlation evident in Fig.
6, an independent test occurs every 150 seconds, a once-per-
year alarm corresponds to PF = 4.75 × 10−6. For this PF ,
the decision threshold calculated via (10) is γ = 0.44 dBW,
and the detection probability is PD = 0.88.
This value of PD gives reason to be optimistic about signal
authentication based on PT for static GNSS receivers. Such
performance depends, however, on the distribution of PT
having exponentially decaying tails. In practice, there are at
least two phenomena that can cause PT to routinely take on
values that would be exceedingly improbable under a Gaussian
distribution: solar radio bursts and non-spoofing interference.
1) Solar Radio Bursts: Recall that PN represents the con-
tribution to PT due to spectrally-flat receiver noise. It can be
related to the receiver and antenna noise temperatures TR and
TA (in degrees Kelvin) by
PN = BN0 = kBB(TR + TA) (15)
where kB is Boltzmann’s constant.
Unpredictable variations in TR arise due to random fluctua-
tions in noise sources internal to the receiver, primarily those
in the first-stage LNA. These are small enough they do not
contribute significantly to the ∼ 0.1 dB variations in PT noted
previously for static antennas.
Variations in TA arise due to antenna motion (as more or
less warm earth radiation is visible), antenna blockage (e.g.,
an increase in TA due snow accumulation [15]), and variable
solar radiation. All these would be difficult or impossible
for a stand-alone (non-networked) GNSS receiver to predict.
Focus here will be on solar radiation as its effect is least site-
specific: all GNSS receivers in the sunlit portion of the earth
are similarly affected.
Solar radio bursts can cause large and sudden variations in
PN , as exemplified by the December 2006 storm, which led
to 10-17 dB increases in PN [53]. The relevant question as
regards PT -based GNSS signal authentication is how often a
burst event would cause PT to exceed the detection threshold,
causing a false alarm. This question is answered in Table I for
three different values of the threshold γ.
TABLE I
TIME BETWEEN THRESHOLD-EXCEEDING SOLAR RADIO BURST EVENTS
FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF THE DETECTION LEVEL γ
Threshold Value Te (days)
γ (dB) TAs (K) S1 (SFU) Solar max. All years
0.44 40.9 1560 9.2 22
0.93 91.3 3488 17.3 42.9
1.5 157.7 6022 26.5 67.4
Table I is interpreted as follows. Assume PI = 0 and let
TA = TA0+TAs, where TAs is the portion of TA due to solar
radiation. Each γ value can then be related to a threshold TAs
by
γ (dB) = 10 log10
[
PA + kBB(TR + TA0 + TAs)
PA + kBB(TR + TA0)
]
assuming the following reasonable parameter values: PA =
−146 dBW, B = 2 MHz, TR = 188 K, TA0 = 100 K. Each
TAs, in turn, is related to a threshold solar flux density S1 by
S1 (SFU) =
2kBTAs
Ae10−22
where the effective antenna area is taken to be Ae = 7.23×
10−3 m2, which is a good approximation for a single-element
GNSS antenna, and the additional factor of 2 in the numerator
reflects the assumption that only half the total-polarization
solar radiation contributes to TAs through a GNSS antenna,
which is designed to received right-hand circularly polarized
signals [54]. The factor 10−22 converts W/m2/Hz to solar flux
units (SFU). The resulting S1 values listed in Table I are those
above which a spoofing detector based on PT would declare
H1 for the corresponding γ. As a final step, the model
N(S > S1, ν1, ν2)
from [55] is invoked (with the correction factor Cgeo) to
approximate the total number of bursts exceeding S1 in the
frequency range [ν1 = 1 GHz, ν2 = 1.7 GHz] over a 40-year
historical period. This is used to estimate Te, the time between
triggering events, for solar maximum years and for all years.
Table I makes clear that solar radio bursts are problematic
for signal authentication based solely on PT . Under the model
in (14), the threshold γ = 0.44 dB leads to a respectable
PD = 0.88 for a once-per-year false alarm. Accounting for
solar radio bursts, the PD remains approximately unchanged,
but the false alarm rate rises to once every 9 days during solar
maximum, or once every 22 days on average across the full
solar cycle. This rate would be unacceptably high for many
applications. Worse yet, there is little refuge in higher γ values
as there would be for a PT distribution having exponentially
decaying tails. At γ = 0.93 dB, which would only yield PD =
0.5 even under the higher-sensitivity spoofing attack scenario
in Section III-C4, the false alarm rate is still greater than once
every two months. Even for γ = 1.5 dB, which would offer
no detection power against a spoofing attack with η = 1, and
only PD = 0.5 for η = 1.7, the long high-side tail of the true
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PT distribution prevents the false alarm rate from dropping to
less than one event in three months.
If these false alarm rates are unacceptable, as they would be
for many applications, then a spoofer could operate without
fear of detection so long as it set η near unity. One may object
to this conclusion by pointing out that spoofing alarms could
be dismissed during known solar radio burst events, which can
be independently monitored—even predicted (see http://www.
swpc.noaa.gov/). But this offers little protection, for a clever
attacker could time his attack to coincide with the arrival of a
sizable burst.
2) Non-Spoofing Interference: Laying aside concerns due
to solar radio bursts, one must also consider the effect of
non-spoofing interference on PT -based signal authentication.
Such interference, whose received power is represented by
PI , ranges from unintentional in-band harmonics to intentional
jamming [56]. It can affect both stationary and moving GNSS
receivers, though the variance of PI will generally be higher
for moving receivers.
The mean and variance of PI are context specific, but
both tend to increase with population density [57]. In recent
years, interference due to so-called personal privacy devices
has become an increasing concern [58], [59]. Current use of
these jammers along major highways results in PT spikes
that, for nearby receivers, would violate any of the thresholds
considered in Table I. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 7, the
jamming profiles seen at closely-spaced sites are different
enough that there will remain a substantial unpredictable PI
component even if local monitoring is in place.
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Fig. 7. Received power in the 10-MHz band centered at GPS L1 at two sites
1 km apart that straddle State Highway 1, west of Austin, TX. Top panel: Data
from site located at the Center for Space Research. Bottom panel: Data from
site located at Applied Research Laboratories. Both traces are normalized by
the average value of PT over the interval.
One might argue that it is perfectly appropriate for a
spoofing detector to alarm in the presence of an intentional
jammer, but the consequences of spoofing can be much more
malign than those of jamming, and so it behooves a defender
to distinguish the two.
Note that non-spoofing interference is not only a problem
for PT -based signal authentication but for all GNSS signal au-
thentication methods that depend on constraining the spoofer
to low values of η, such as the pincer defense [36]. This
defense is less sensitive to solar radio bursts than PT -based
signal authentication, but equally likely to declare a false alarm
in the face of strong non-spoofing interference.
E. Evaluation Summary
Even granting the full signal admixture assumption, it
appears that, contrary to the claim made in [15], spoofing
detection based solely on received power PT is inadequate for
GNSS signal authentication, for two reasons: (1) the increase
in PT due to spoofing can be small (less than 1 dB), and (2)
a long tail in the distribution of PN due to solar radiation
causes high PF for any reasonable PD and, for receivers in
urban areas, the same can be true for PI due to non-spoofing
interference. These conditions amount to a violation of the
small unpredictable variations assumption.
Despite its weakness, a PT -based defense remains a useful
component of GNSS signal authentication, as it prevents an
attacker from employing an arbitrary η. It is best thought of
as a necessary, but not sufficient, test for GNSS signal authen-
tication. For increased potency, PT testing can be combined
with a correlation distortion test, as in [36], a cryptographic
test, as in [28], [29], or another substantially independent and
complementary test. Note that jointly testing for unusual PT
and C/N0 values is only slightly better than testing PT alone:
at the expense of a slightly higher η, a spoofer can inject noise
padding to ensure that its signals’ C/N0 values match those
of the authentic signals.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE SCER ATTACK DEFENSE
The SCER attack defense, originally developed in [29],
assumes that the authentic broadcast GNSS signals have been
modulated with a signal-specific binary security code that is
unpredictable to the spoofer but verifiable by the defender
(possibly after a delay). Unable to predict the security code,
the spoofer resorts to modulating its counterfeit signal repli-
cas with security code chips estimated on-the-fly. The key
to defending against a SCER attack is a detection statistic
sensitive to the high error variance of the spoofer’s security
code chip estimates in the moments immediately following
each unpredictable chip transition. Ref. [29] develops such a
statistic, describes its distribution underH0 and H1, and offers
preliminary results using this paper’s testbed. This section
explains how the detection statistic is generated in practice
within a GNSS receiver and offers a more extensive empirical
evaluation of the SCER attack defense.
A. Detection Test
A single-signal SCER attack can be modeled by the follow-
ing hypothesis pair for the samples Yk output by the defender’s
RF front end during the interval spanned by the lth security
code chip:
H0 : Yk = Wlsk +Nk, (16a)
H1 : Yk = g
[
αWˆl(nlk)sk +Nk
]
(16b)
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Under hypothesisH0, the received signal is an authentic GNSS
signal with security code chip value Wl and underlying signal
sk = ck cos(2pifIFtk + θk), where ck is the signal’s binary
spreading code, fIF is the intermediate frequency in Hz, and θk
is the beat carrier phase. The noise samples Nk are modeled as
independent and Gaussian. Under hypothesis H1, the received
signal is a spoofer-generated exact counterfeit of sk modulated
by an estimate Wˆl(nlk) of the lth security code chip. The
index nlk represents the number of samples that contribute to
the spoofer’s estimate of Wl. The coefficient α is the spoofing
amplitude factor, which is proportional to
√
η, and g is the
automatic gain control factor imposed by the RF front end to
maintain constant power in Yk .
Ref. [29] offers further details on the model in (16) and for-
mulates a detection statistic appropriate for defending against a
SCER attack. The current paper illustrates how this statistic is
generated within a GNSS receiver. For clarity of presentation,
assume the security code is carried in the navigation data
stream so that each unpredictable security code chipWl is also
a navigation data symbol. In other words, assume a navigation
message authentication security scheme [28]. Further assume
that the receiver’s accumulation (pre-detection) interval is
equivalent to the length of Wl. Then the detection statistic
L can be generated as shown in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 8. Block diagram illustrating how generation of the SCER attack statistic
L relates to standard GNSS signal correlation. Thick lines denote complex
signals, whereas thin lines denote real-valued signals.
By way of further explanation, consider the two signal paths
shown in Fig. 8. The lower path is the standard matched-filter-
type correlation operation commonly implemented in GNSS
receivers. The product of the incoming samples Yk and a
complex local signal replica rk = Wlcˆk exp[−j(2pifIFtk+θˆk)]
is accumulated over the interval spanned by Wl to produce
the prompt complex correlation products Il + jQl that get
fed to code and carrier tracking loops. The code tracking
loop also ingests correlation products from identical paths—
not shown—having early and late versions of cˆk.
The upper path in Fig. 8 produces the SCER attack detection
statistic L. The real part of the product Ykrk is multiplied
by a smooth weighting function β(nlk), defined in [29],
that gives full weight to the klth sample but decays rapidly
toward zero for subsequent samples. This weighting has the
effect of suppressing those samples over which the error
variance in the spoofer’s security code chip estimate Wˆl has
become small because the spoofer has had sufficient time
to obtain an accurate estimate of Wl; only the early high-
variance samples are useful in distinguishing H1 from H0.
The weighted product β(nlk)R(Ykrk) is accumulated over the
interval spanned by Wl to produce the single-chip detection
statistic Sl, N of which are biased, squared, and accumulated
as shown to produce the final statistic L. The constants a and
b are related to the theoretical mean µj and variance σ
2
j of Sl
under Hj , j = 0, 1 by
a =
1
σ20
− 1
σ21
, b = 2
(
µ1
σ21
− µ0
σ20
)
B. Test Setup
Due to its ∼ 5-ms processing latency, the real-time spoofer,
in its current form, is not capable of a near-zero-latency
SCER attack in which the spoofer’s output security code
chip estimates are approximately aligned with those of the
authentic security-code-enhanced signals when received by the
defender. Note that although a zero-latency attack is physically
impossible for a real-time system, a near-zero-latency attack
(e.g., less than 50 ns latency) could be achieved in real
time with an FPGA-based real-time spoofer. For the SCER
attack results presented in this paper, the post-processing
testbed’s digital I/O spoofer was used, which can be configured
to mount a SCER attack with arbitrary latency. To permit
evaluation of the most-potent limiting case, the digital I/O
spoofer was configured to mount a zero-latency attack.
The attack proceeded as follows. The digital I/O spoofer
ingested authentic recorded GPS L1 C/A data and, treating
the ±1-valued 20-ms navigation data bits as if they were
unpredictable security code chips, generated a maximum a
posteriori (hard-decision) estimate for each chip. Near the
beginning of each chip, when the spoofer had few signal
samples on which to base its estimate, these chip values would
switch wildly between −1 and 1. But with each successive
sample received, the error variance of the spoofer’s chip
estimate would diminish until, after about 100 µs, the estimate
would become virtually certain. The spoofer continuously
modulated each of 8 constituent spoofing signals in its output
ensemble with the corresponding chip estimate trains.
The spoofer began its attack with its counterfeit signals
approximately code-phase-aligned and data-aligned to the au-
thentic signals. After maintaining this alignment for several
hundred seconds, it attempted pulloff of the defender’s track-
ing loops, stopping once it had attained an offset of 175 µs
with respect to the authentic signals. Due to the orthogonality
of the GPS C/A codes, there was no significant interplay
between the authentic and counterfeit signals at this offset.
The digital I/O spoofer’s output data were sample-wise mul-
tiplexed with the original authentic data to produce a digital
data stream containing the composite spoofing and authentic
signal ensembles. The multiplexing ratio was adjusted so that
η ≈ 1.2. A preliminary segment of the data was left free of
spoofing to allow testing of the defender’s ability to detect the
onset of attack.
The combined data stream was routed to the testbed’s
digital-input software-defined receiver, acting as defender,
which tracked the signals present and produced samples
equivalent to the product Ykrk in Fig. 8. The real parts of
these samples were weighted by an appropriate β(n) and
accumulated to generate a sequence of chip-level statistics Sl.
Batches of N = 400 Sl were combined to produce a full
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detection statistic L every 8 seconds during the course of the
experiment.
All signals tracked by the spoofer had spoofer-measured
carrier-to-noise ratios (C/N0)s ≥ 46 dB-Hz whereas, due
to the way multiplexing was effected, the authentic signals
tracked by the defender prior to attack had defender-measured
carrier-to-noise ratios 40 < (C/N0)r < 42 dB-Hz. Thus, the
spoofer enjoyed at least a 4 dB carrier-to-noise advantage over
the defender in the attack, which, for the defender, represents
a challenging attack scenario. In the formulation of L, the
defender’s assumed values for (C/N0)s and (C/N0)r, which
influence µj and σj , j = 1, 2, and, by extension, the theo-
retical distributions pL|Hj(ξ|Hj), j = 1, 2, were taken to be
approximately the true values of (C/N0)s and (C/N0)r. The
defender’s assumed value of η was taken to be η = ηm = 1,
not far from the true η = 1.2. Thus, the defender’s model
for the distribution of L, upon which its decision threshold
for each signal was based, was approximately equal to the
true distribution of L for that signal, except during the initial
aligned stage of the attack over which interaction of the
spoofing and authentic signals unavoidably violated the model
in (16). The defender’s detection threshold was set such that
PF = 10
−4.
C. Test Results
The following test results are expressed in terms of the
empirical distribution of L at various stages of a SCER attack.
Typical results will be presented first, followed by discussion
of less typical results.
250 300 350 400 450 500 550
Authentic signal only
Initial aligned attack
After carry−off
pL|H1(ξ|H1)
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Histogram of
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Fig. 9. Histograms of experimentally-generated detection statistics L (bar
plots) compared with the detection threshold (thick vertical line) and the
theoretical distributions pL|Hj (ξ|Hj), j = 0, 1 at various stages of a zero-
delay SCER attack on the signal corresponding to PRN 17.
1) Typical Results: The top panel in Fig. 9 shows the
attack prelude during which only the authentic signal was
present. At this stage, the histogram of L values exhibits good
correspondence with the theoretical null-hypothesis probability
distribution pL|H0(ξ|H0). The center panel shows the situation
during the initial stage of the attack when the authentic and
spoofing signals were aligned to within a small fraction of the
∼ 1-µs spreading code chip interval. Because the counterfeit
and authentic signals in this test were so nearly matched in
power, this stage saw strong interaction between them in the
defender’s complex-valued prompt correlator. Such interaction
violates the either/or assumption of (16); nonetheless, the
detection statistic exceeds the threshold more than half the
time. However, instead of clustering within pL|H1(ξ|H1), the
histogram exhibits spreading. Fig. 10 shows a time history
of L during this stage of the attack. The slow changes in L
are driven by variations in the relative carrier phase of the
interacting authentic and spoofing signals.
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Fig. 10. A time history of the defender-measured value of the decision
statistic L during the aligned stage of the attack on PRN 17. Each trial
represents an 8-second interval.
After the spoofer has successfully carried off the defender’s
tracking points and the authentic and spoofed correlation peaks
are separated by more than two spreading code chips, the
model in (16) again becomes valid. The bottom panel of
Fig. 9 shows that at this stage the detection statistic clearly
clusters beyond the detection threshold and roughly within the
theoretical pL|H1(ξ|H1) distribution. It should be noted that in
the experiment the post-pulloff C/N0 value measured by the
defender did not change significantly relative to the measured
C/N0 prior to the attack. Thus, a naive spoofing detection
strategy that triggers on changes in C/N0 would have failed
to detect this attack.
The favorable results shown in Fig. 9, together with those
originally presented in [29], are fairly typical—they are rep-
resentative of 2/3 of the results from similar experiments
conducted on the testbed at various values of (C/N0)r and
(C/N0)s.
2) Atypical Results: Figs. 11 and 12 show results repre-
sentative of the remaining 1/3 of the cases studied. As with
the previous results, the empirical histograms of L under H0
exhibit good agreement with the theoretical pL|H0(ξ|H0) (top
panels). The histograms during the initial aligned attack (center
panels) are to the left of the threshold [Fig. 11] or spread
widely [Fig. 12], yet not atypical given the various ways that
the counterfeit and authentic signals can interact at this stage.
However, under H1 (bottom panels), the empirical histograms
are unusual: they are wider than the theoretical pL|H1(ξ|H1),
and, in the case of Fig. 12, lower in mean value. This mismatch
has the effect of reducing PD to 0.87 for the case in Fig. 11 and
to 0.46 for Fig. 12. The reason for this mismatch is unclear,
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as there was no significant interaction between authentic and
counterfeit signals at this stage of the attack.
250 300 350 400 450 500 550
Authentic signal only
Initial aligned attack
After carry−off
ξ
Fig. 11. As Fig. 9 except for PRN 27.
250 300 350 400 450 500 550
Authentic signal only
Initial aligned attack
After carry−off
ξ
Fig. 12. As Fig. 9 except for PRN 4.
D. Evaluation Summary
Experimental results indicate close agreement between the
empirical and theoretical distributions of L under H0. This
implies that the false alarm rate for the SCER attack defense
is consistent with the value of PF used to set the detection
threshold. If the value PF = 0.0001 chosen in the experiments
is unacceptably high for a given application, PF can be
lowered while maintaining a useful PD: for a low-rate security
code, PF = 10
−6 results in PD > 0.85 [29]. Similarly,
in 2/3 of cases studied there was close agreement between
the empirical and theoretical distributions of L under H1,
which implies that the theoretical value of PD , which was
near unity for all the experimental scenarios studied, can
be approximately reached in practice. Even in atypical cases
of disagreement, PD remained above 0.46. Thus, compared
to the received power defense, the SCER attack defense is
significantly more powerful.
Nonetheless, the SCER attack defense has three weaknesses.
First, during the initial stage of a signal-aligned attack, L can
remain below the detection threshold over an extended interval
due to interaction between the authentic and counterfeit signals
[cf. Fig. 11, center panel]. One might think that poor PD
is irrelevant at this stage given that the spoofer has not
yet attempted pulloff, but it turns out that if a majority
of signals are being spoofed the multipath-like effects of
aligned counterfeit and authentic signal interaction can cause
navigation errors of several tens of meters. Of course, in this
case the likelihood that at least one channel’s L rises above the
detection threshold remains quite high, so one may consider
this a minor weakness.
The second weakness of the SCER attack defense concerns
the spoofing power advantage η. It is shown in [29] that a
defender can maintain PD above 0.9 even under a challenging
SCER attack scenario so long as η is known. When the
defender significantly underestimates η, however, PD can fall
precipitously for low (C/N0)r. The defender could address
this weakness by estimating η via observation of PT , using
(13) and taking ηm = 1 as a lower bound on the estimate.
This amounts to a generalized likelihood ratio test with η as
the composite parameter to be estimated [49]. Note that, under
this strategy, an increase in PT due to a solar radio burst or
non-spoofing interference would not significantly affect PF .
The third and most significant weakness of the SCER attack
defense is that it fails in the case of a near-zero-latency pure
replay (meaconing) attack because in this case Wˆl = Wl.
While one should not expect a defense designed for SCER
attacks to also detect a pure replay attack, it nonetheless
remains true that a pure replay attack is easy to mount—much
easier than a SCER attack—and, while not enjoying the same
flexibility as a SCER attack to dictate an erroneous navigation
and timing solution, is dangerously effective. To address this
weakness, the SCER attack defense could be combined with
the pincer defense [36], which is effective against a pure replay
attack. However, like the received power defense, the pincer
defense is prone to false alarms in the face of a large increase
in PT not related to spoofing.
V. CONCLUSIONS
An experimental testbed for developing and evaluating
GNSS signal authentication techniques has been described
and used to evaluate two candidate signal authentication
techniques. It was shown that the first technique, the received
power defense proposed in [15], fails to detect a spoofing
attack when the spoofing power advantage η ≈ 1 and when the
false alarm probability PF < 10
−6. Even when PF = 10
−4,
which would result in approximately one false alarm every
14
17 days during solar maximum, the detection probability PD
remains below 0.5. Nonetheless, the received power defense
remains useful for detecting unsophisticated spoofers that
resort to η ≫ 1.
The SCER attack defense proposed in [29] was also evalu-
ated, assuming a low-rate security code consistent with navi-
gation message authentication. In most cases, the empirical PF
and PD matched the modeled values, which ensured PD ≈ 1
for PF = 10
−4 and PD > 0.85 for PF = 10
−6. However,
in some cases the empirical PD dropped below the theoretical
PD , sometimes as low as 0.5 for PF = 10
−4. The SCER attack
defense may also suffer from low PD during the initial stage
of an aligned attack, though if several signals are spoofed the
chance of at least one channel alarming remains high. For good
performance, the SCER attack defense should continuously
estimate η from measurements of the received power PT .
The most significant weakness of the SCER attack defense
is its inability to detect a pure replay (meaconing) attack,
which, while not as flexible as a SCER attack, is nonetheless
potent and dangerous. However, it should be noted that all
cryptographic GNSS signal authentication schemes, even those
based on high-rate military-style security codes, are vulnerable
to pure replay attacks.
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